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Scientific Knowledge through Involvement – 
How to Do Respectful Othering* 
Hans Christian Garmann Johnsen 
 
The theme of this article is how we as social scientists can research others 
through involvement, and develop true knowledge about the other without 
“othering” them, that is, not objectifying them or making them an instru-
ment in our research, but rather be respectful of the other as a person. The 
thesis of this article is that othering is a matter of degree as well as prin-
ciples. Social science and Action research can do respectful othering. 
Doing that is both a matter of personal skill and the wisdom of the re-
searcher and of complying with some design principles. I argue that these 
design principles can be related to four areas of knowledge that we are 
likely to find in an involved research situation: knowledge about oneself, 
knowledge about the other, knowledge about the relation and knowledge 
about the situation. 
Key words: involvement, respectful othering, action research,  
research design, knowledge 
 
Introduction 
The question I will try to discuss in this article is the following: a) how can 
we as social scientists research others through involvement, and develop true 
knowledge about the other without “othering” them, that is, not objectifying 
                                           
*  I should like to thank Professor Davydd Greenwood, Professor Tor Claussen, Profes-
sor Richard Ennals and Professor Olav Eikeland for critical and constructive com-
ments. 
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them or making them an instrument in our research, but rather be respectful 
of the other as a person? I use the word involvement to indicate that I have in 
mind a research situation where one is approaching the other in a personal 
way, trying to get a deeper understanding of the other, and also intending to 
develop knowledge in a reflective process with the other.  
This question is closely linked to other questions of a more philosophical, 
sociological and theory of science kind, which I will only briefly touch upon 
here. For example, one could ask; b) Why should we be interested in answer-
ing this question (question a),1 and not least c) why should Action Research-
ers in particular be concerned with these questions? This paper is not mainly 
about b) or c). Question b) and c) have been dealt with by others, also in this 
journal, like Shotter (2004) and Eikeland (2007).2 However, I will have to 
make some references to these debates in order to position my discussion on 
question a). My thesis is that we can do objective research on others without 
othering, and use this insight to develop more general knowledge of society, 
again without othering. Key to this, I argue, is how you do your research. The 
article’s purpose is to discuss the issue of othering, and present some design 
principles for respectful othering in social research.   
The philosophical and sociological discourse on alienation, othering and 
objectification of the other, forms the background for question a). The issue 
of not othering others is relevant for all social science research, not only 
Action Research. However, they are also references to arguments by Action 
Researchers against some forms of conventional social research. Subse-
                                           
1  Max Weber in his posthumous Economy and Society [1920] addresses the issue of 
subjective and objective knowledge, and also the relation between the individuals “in-
ner world” and social science. He argued that social science should discuss meaningful 
social action, not the inner psychology of the individual as such. These are big, general 
and classical questions in social science but questions that are still often tacitly or ex-
plicitly implied in discussions between Action research and conventional social re-
search 
2  Vol. 3 in 2007 of International Journal of Action Research is dedicated to a discussion 
on Diversity of Action research – experiences and perspectives. However, this article 
is not about how action research can contribute to change, it is about how we can 
know (and evaluate) that information we get at an intimate level of communication is 
true and still behave as researchers in a respectful and human way. 
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quently, it is natural to start my discussion with a review of some main 
positions in current debate within Action Research on this issue.   
The structure of this article is as follows: First I briefly recall some of the 
arguments within Action Research related to othering. Second I go briefly 
into the sociological/philosophical debate on different understandings of 
othering. Third, I give some examples from my own research on the rele-
vance of this topic, and use organization theory as my specific reference. 
Fourth, I discuss how can we research others and develop true knowledge3 
about the other without othering them, that is, not objectifying them or 
making an instrument in our research, but rather be respectful of the other as 
a person? The thesis of this article is that othering is a matter of degree as 
well as principles. Social science and Action Research can do respectful 
othering. Doing that is both a matter of personal skill and the wisdom of the 
researcher, and of complying with some design principles. 
1.  Action research and the debate on “othering”   
Action Research is a particular kind of scientific method, or rather a method-
ology, and thereby important; it is a perspective on how to do research, more 
than a method (Greenwood 2007), but it is also a scientific method for 
knowledge production, a method for finding out “how things are” and to give 
a true reporting of things (Johnsen 2005).4 It is particular among others, 
                                           
3  I use the term truth here in a common sense meaning, like William James who defines 
truth as: “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, corroborate and verify.” (James 
1978: 169). That is I do not go into a deeper discussion of truth as such, like Kuhn’s 
argument that there is no truth (Williams 2001). The theory of science discourse on 
truth (Habermas 1998; Williams 2001; Blackburn 2005) deals with truth as an essen-
tial phenomenon (are there absolute truth?). I believe that even those who reject abso-
lute truth in an essential sense, still commonsensical will accept that we suppose that a 
scientist “tells the truth”, or that we can and must deal with truth in everyday matters 
(like; did you steal the apple?).    
4  I have previously argued (together with my colleague Roger Normann; 2004) that the 
action researcher has a challenge in order to identify a legitimate democratic mandate 
in complex environments. I have also argued (together with my colleague Roger Nor-
mann and Jens Kristian Fosse; 2005) what it implies to be an active part in promoting 
development. It implies to take part in a reflective process as something different from 
being a stakeholder or negotiating interests. Furthermore, I have argued that action 
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because it, in line with anti-positivistic arguments, acknowledges the subjec-
tivity of the researcher, and the fact that the researcher through her research 
influences the field.  
This implies that firstly Action Research is explicit on this influence, and 
secondly that it thereby acknowledges that research is normative, and that the 
researcher subsequently has an ethical responsibility to justify her role. But 
acknowledging subjectivity also means that there is a particular challenge to 
distinguish between personal and subjective knowledge and more general, 
objective and true knowledge.   
Furthermore, the argument is that Action Research co-generates knowl-
edge (Lincoln/Guba 1985; Heron 1996), that is:  
“Action Research is a special method because it tests ideas in practice 
in the context of application, and the stakeholders together evaluate the 
validity of the knowledge.”5  
One position to take could be to claim that co-generated knowledge more or 
less by itself is true in a more objective sense, or to reject the whole notion of 
objective truth. None of these are the positions I will develop here.  
An example of how Action Research has positioned itself against conven-
tional (positivist) research could be illustrated by the work of Lincoln and 
Guba (1985). In their Naturalistic Inquiry they argue against positivism:  
“Positivism has produced research with human respondents that ignore 
their humanness, a fact that has not only ethical but also validity implica-
tions.” (Lincoln/Guba 1985: 27). 
Similar arguments are found in (Shotter 2004), who talks about (conven-
tional-, positivistic-) research as dehumanizing.6 Against this Lincoln and 
                                           
research is a way of producing knowledge and provide certain types of knowledge, but 
can and should have fruitful dialogues with other, more conventional research traditi-
ons (Johnsen 2005) and in Johnsen et al (2009) I argue together with colleagues that 
action research is not sufficiently legitimised with the dichotomy of local versus uni-
versal knowledge. This paper adds to this line of argument a particular perspective.  
5  This formulation was given to me by Davydd Greenwood in his comments to an 
earlier version of this paper. 
6  John Shotter (2004) has challenged traditional social research and argues that we 
should “… move from systems conceived of as ‘logical’ or as ‘rational’ by a special 
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Guba (1985) propose an emic research strategy, one that that tries to under-
stand the individual from its own premises, to be involved in the other, in 
their own life situation, and thereby understand the other based on the others 
experience.7 
However, will involved research with co-generation of knowledge be a 
sufficient answer to the question of how to generate true knowledge about the 
other? It is a dilemma to be involved and participating on the one hand, and 
on the other hand to observe (Searle 1995). The one is to be in a situation, to 
be a participant, the other to be outside, to be an observer8. Can Action 
Research overcome this dilemma? Being involved implies a very intimate 
observation and impressions that, by its nature, are subjective and coloured 
by our pre-understandings (Gadamer 2006):9  
Olav Eikeland has argued in this journal (2007) for different positions 
within Action Research. One position is where research is collaborative and 
the researcher is strongly reflective. In such a situation, one can imagine that 
knowledge is not othering, but really a common product (co-generated) 
(Guba and Lincoln 1985; Greenwood 2007). An even more “extreme” posi-
tion will be practitioners’ research, where the researcher herself has abdi-
cated, and the reflection (learning) is purely that of the practitioners. How-
ever, this must be regarded as an exception. As Eikeland (2007) points out, 
generating democratic dialogue, doing interventions and other strategies that 
                                           
elite of researcher-theoreticians, to new dialogically structured practices within which 
all of us as ordinary people become our own research-theoreticians. (…) Otherwise, 
we all run the risk of becoming members of the same democracy of misery in a con-
tinuing round of mutual humiliating attempt to ‘solve problems’ by the application of 
supposed ‘scientific’ methods by professional elites” (Shotter 2004: 29). 
7  I read this as form of phenomenology, that is a position on understanding how the 
other understands reality. 
8  This is brilliantly discussed by the Norwegian philosopher Hans Skjervheim. A well 
formulated essay by him, Deltakar og Tilskodar, is unfortunately not translated into 
English. However Jürgen Habermas gives a tribute to Skjervheim’s work from 1959: 
Objectivity and the study of man (see Habermas 1997. 111-115) 
9  Hermeneutics does not pretend to know the uniqueness of other, as Shotter (2007) 
argues for. Similarly, Eikeland (2007) argues that episteme always will refer to some-
thing general, not the unique.  
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Action Researchers often follow, requires knowledge and positioning that 
will implicitly assume objectification (othering). Olav Eikeland writes:  
“As I see it, however, Action Research may be understood as basically 
constituted in the 1940s by breaking out of the ‘othering-business’ – 
studying ‘the others’ – of mainstream, experimental social research, by 
expanding the community of inquiry and interpretation to include the sub-
jects studied (…). I think the (potential) implications of this practical 
‘break out’ are more radical than is often realized. Instead of a segregated 
‘we’ (‘them’) of researchers studying ‘them’ (‘us’), an expanded ‘we’ start 
to study ourselves: What are we doing to ourselves and to each other, how 
and why?” (Eikeland 2006) 
Furthermore, he writes:  
“Are ‘othering-effects’ possible to eliminate completely? Hardly com-
pletely, since we all are ‘others’ to each other. But there are still many dif-
ferent degrees of ‘othering’, or exclusion-inclusion.” (Eikeland 2006) 
I would like to go a step further than Olav Eikeland does here, and claim that 
some sort of “othering” is necessary, useful and completely in line with the 
normative objectives of Action Research. This is in fact the starting point of 
my argument. Although I will not discuss if Action Research should objectiv-
ise the other (do “othering”), I will rather argue for how objectification can 
be done without humiliating the other? That is, I believe that we need to 
distinguish between at least two concepts of objectification, one that treats 
the other in a disrespectful way (as guinea pigs or social dopes, as it is named 
in the slang of experimental social research), and one that helps understand 
the other in an objective, but still respectful way. This last form of objectify-
ing of the other (respectful othering) is necessary in order to develop true 
knowledge about society, and thereby to help developing society and the 
other, I argue.  
2.  Involvement, alienation and research strategies 
Before I turn to the question about how to do “respectful othering”, I will 
review some of the debates within social science and philosophy where the 
relevance of this issue is addressed. Scientific knowledge within the social 
 Scientific Knowledge through Involvement – How to Do Respectful Othering 49 
  
 
sciences, particularly within the “post-positivist” tradition, can be seen as a 
way of objectifying human beings, and through that, one runs into the risk of 
doing the service of alienating (Etzioni 1961), disembedding (Giddens 1984), 
invading the lifeworld (Habermas 1997) or dehumanizing (Shotter 2004) the 
individual (van der Berg 1998). Arguing for this risk is often linked to anti-
modernist arguments. In fact a considerable part of critical (Marxian) social 
theory has argued for the parallel process of growth of modern capitalist 
society, in the sense of materialization, and that of objectification of the 
individual and subsequently dehumanization (alienation) (Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2005).  
I will argue here that there is a close resemblance between the concepts of 
alienating, disembedding, invading the lifeworld and dehumanizing, and I 
will thereby use them interchangeably. However, I do not believe that all 
types of othering is equal to alienating, disembedding, invading the lifeworld 
and dehumanizing, nor accept that all forms of modernism has a negative, 
othering, effect. This needs an explanation. 
Alienation in Hegel’s and Marx meaning, presupposes the authentic (Tay-
lor 1998), realizing self. The alienated or dehumanized, is the one who cannot 
recognize himself in the world (Safranski 2002: 116), where the world does 
not give meaning, or where I in the world cannot reflect on my existence, 
because I am not in dialogue with that world; it gives no reason or meaning to 
me. This dualism between involvement and meaning on the one hand and 
meaninglessness, alienation and nothingness on the other, that is found in 
Marxist social theory, presupposes the idea of an idealized, authentic, and 
true self, against which any limitation to its trueness is a threat of alienation10. 
Humans are in a constant struggle to be recognized (that is; not alienated), 
and this is a prime drive and process in society (Honneth 1992). However, I 
will show that there are more nuanced positions to be considered than the 
dualism between alienation and involvement  
Amitai Etzioni in his 1961 work A Comparative Analysis of Complex Or-
ganizations: On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates argues that differ-
ent structures (situations) have a congruent relationship with alienation and 
                                           
10  I have earlier discussed the issue of involvement in (Johnsen 2001, 2002).  
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involvement. In Etzioni’s model, there are three levels of involvement: 
alienation (negative involvement, typical in relation to strangers or unfriendly 
situations), calculative involvement (the type of involvement found in busi-
ness contract situations), and moral involvement (the type of involvement 
found in one’s relation to the church or in teacher-pupil relations) (Etzioni 
1961:10). Social context (situation), subsequently in this model defines 
alienation or involvement. What I find illuminating with this theory is that it 
makes a clear contrast between alienation and forms of involvement as 
different modes of relations defined by a situation.  
I will not see this as a deterministic process, that a particular situation 
necessarily implies a specific type of involvement or automatically leads to 
alienation, but rather claim the other way, that context changes as we become 
involved. We cannot be calculative and truly and morally involved at the 
same time. Involvement influences our attention and, so to speak, leads our 
mind from the social and system world into the lifeworld. Involvement 
thereby has a bounding effect on us that is defined by the situation. For 
example: we do not normally develop deep involvement as we pass the 
cashier in the supermarket. The logic of that situation does not make deep 
involvement natural. On the other hand, a (Action) Researcher who wants to 
understand emotional labour in that same shop might (to some degree) get 
involved with the cashier.    
Following Etzioni’s argument, I will try to understand involvement in the 
sense of respectful concern about the other, on the background of its nega-
tion, alienation. I do this because the traditional Marxist understanding of 
alienation is, I believe, deliberately or tacitly a form of reference for the 
general discourse on this issue that has inspired the humanistic (anti-
positivistic) arguments presented earlier, and also the somewhat stereotyped 
understandings of this phenomenon. I further mention this position, because I 
want to contrast it with a more modified and diverse understanding of peo-
ple’s both intimate and remote relations that I will try to present here.  
Alienation is a prime concept within Marxism. Karl Marx was an early 
critique of modern work organization, in particular wage labour. The Marxist 
alienation concepts have two major dimensions. The first is rather materialis-
tic and social, in stating that people develop their self-identity through work, 
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and since wage labour (in contrast to a self-owned farmer) decouples his/her 
labour from his/her living (uniqueness), with money wages as the only link 
between the two, he or she is alienated. Alienation is, in this case, a de-
coupling of meaning system (Gabel 1984; Honneth 1992). Alienation occurs 
because in a modern, mass production industry, the subject (worker) creates 
objects (products) that are remote and meaningless to him, because he is not 
part of the process of creation. The product becomes an object in the system 
world, something to be traded, and something where the individual worker’s 
effort is insignificant and unidentifiable. In this sense he or she is alienated. 
The second dimension of alienation is related to the idea that labour de-
velops a universal class-consciousness and identity. To be alienated in this 
sense is to develop a false class-identity, to become “bourgeois” (Merton 
1951). This second type of Marxist alienation forms the background of 
Honneth’s critique of Habermas’ concept of instrumental action (Honneth 
1982; Outhwaite 1997:25).11 
I mention these two understandings of alienation, the material and the 
cognitive (metaphysical) one, not because I want to discuss and contradict 
Marxism as such, but because they are references for how alienation is 
commonly understood. As I try to argue here, I take the position that alien-
                                           
11  If there is something called class-consciousness, and this phenomenon is outside the 
instrumental sphere of the individual (which was probably the original Marxists’ posi-
tion, borrowed from Hegel’s concept of the Geist [spirit]), then Habermas’ whole 
concept of instrumentality is false. In a more contemporary phrasing, we might say 
that individuals are disembedded (alienated). As Giddens argues: “Modern institutions 
are seen to have taken over larger areas of social life and drained them of the 
meaningful content they once had. The private sphere is thus left weakened and 
amorphous, even though many of life’s prime satisfactions are to be found there 
because the world of “instrumental reason” is intrinsically limited in terms of the va-
lues it can realise. Jürgen Habermas’ analysis of the separation of the technical sys-
tems from the life-world is one variant of this position, as is the view set out by Max 
Horkheimer a generation before. Seeking of friendship and intimacy, Horkheimer ar-
gues that in organised capitalism “personal initiative plays an ever smaller role in 
comparison to the plans of those in authority”; personal engagement with others “re-
mains at best, a leisure-time rifle” (Giddens 1995: 116). A slightly different, but 
somewhat parallel argumentation could be developed from Heidegger (2007) and his 
critique of instrumental reason, and subsequent endorsement of the authentic in the 
lifeworld (Dasein). This argument sees any instrumentality and modernity as an 
assault on authenticity. 
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ation is a more nuanced phenomenon that does not automatically follow from 
context. I reject a sort of argument that implies social determinism.12  
3.  Involvement, alienation and transformation of identity at work –  
a case 
Let me illustrate what I have in mind, with two cases from my own prac-
tice.13 These two cases are not representative for all my discussions and 
arguments, but are indications and exemplifications of where in practice one 
might deal with these questions. The first case (case 1) is a situation where I 
worked with a union leader in a large organizational change project in an 
industrial plant over many years. As we became more known to each other, 
and as the process evolved and became significant to the company, the union 
leader experienced a great personal transformation. The process he was 
involved in became very emotional and personal to him. The most critical 
point during this process that had lasted for some years and where the work-
ers union initially had taken the role of being in a constant opposition to 
management, came when the general manager invited the union leader to co-
operate on organizational development. Should the union leader take the 
chance? Should he suddenly trust the manager? If it failed, would he be 
regarded as a traitor by fellow workers? These where questions that he faced 
and that during a short period he had to decide on. As I as Action Researcher 
had participated in initiating the process of dialogue in the company, he 
called me, would like to have personal talks with me and some advise, before 
he made up his mind. It was very clear that this was not only a matter of a 
practical negotiation in the company, but for him also a matter of identity. 
Going into this co-operation with the management would imply a transforma-
tion of his whole conception of work relations, values and identity, he argued.  
This transformation was on the one hand important for the process I had 
helped initiate in the company, but on the other hand involved me in a way 
                                           
12  As I have argued above, I assume that individuals are autonomous (although often in a 
constrained sense) and can choose among others to be or not be involved. I thereby 
reject this metaphysical class consciousness concept. 
13  Both cases are more or less presented in Johnsen (2001).  
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that I was not prepared for. As I will argue, this case relates to my question 
on how should I as an Action Researcher proceed in order to handle this 
personal, involved situation in a respectful way. 
The second case (case 2) I will use as an example was an organizational 
change process in a hotel I participated in over some years. The process had 
emphasized employees’ engagement and encouraged a more personally 
involved and team based organization. I had one of the team leaders as one of 
my main contacts in the hotel. I interviewed her many times. After some 
years, our project was disrupted because the hotel changed owners and 
entered an international hotel chain. This hotel chain had a uniform business 
concept that they wanted to introduce, different from the one we had pro-
moted. When the hotel chain started implementing their new concept, the 
team leader saw her work situation completely change. She had, encouraged 
by me and my fellow researchers in the process, developed a very personal 
style of management, engaged heavily in her employees, helping them also in 
personal matters and involved herself in, and devoted herself to, the work. 
She was single, without children and to a great extent “lived her life” with the 
job. In a very emotional interview, she told me that this new management 
concept was a catastrophe in her life, that all she had invested in was lost. I 
think this experience brought me close to what I see as the issue of the rela-
tion between a personal story, and the “truth” about the organizational 
change.    
Before I present more of these cases, let me elaborate a little of how the 
issue of personal involvement is perceived in some modern organizational 
thinking. The modern work-situation induces a more instrumental form of 
action.14 However, there are different levels of instrumentality, and subse-
                                           
14  This can be interpreted in many ways. As is noted by du Gay (1996), the Marxian 
assumption of the worker as a mere production element leads to the concept of alien-
ation. Alienation can be defined as negative involvement and is associated with con-
cepts like “Taylorism” and “Fordism” that belong to this pre-physiological period in 
organizational thinking (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 121). Involvement will in this case 
be to re-establish a link between work and meaning, give the worker a significant role 
in and influence on the production process. The Human Relations movement 
(McGregor 1960) and the Norwegian economic democracy programme (Emery/ 
Thorsrud 1975) worked very much within this framework. 
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quently different degrees of identification and involvement in an organiza-
tion. Participation, identity formation, and communication, or what Weick 
(1995) calls sensemaking, Mintzberg et al (1998) call emergent sensemaking 
and Wright et al (2000) call resourceful sensemaking, within firms empha-
sizes the contingency, embeddedness, inter-subjectivity and individuality of 
these involvement processes.  
“The psychological literature on attribution and social perception suggests 
that we form attachments to courses of action through a cognitive process 
of reconciling our behaviours with our beliefs and making attributions 
about the causes of our behaviour. The key point of this discussion is to 
emphasize how an organisation’s HR practices (and the processes by 
which those practices are implemented) can affect commitment and moti-
vation, sometimes in ways that those who design and implement those 
practices did not anticipate.” (Baron/Kreps 1999: 102) 
Following Baron and Kreps (1999), it may be argued that organizational 
context influences action, and it might even influence involvement, but in 
ways that are sometimes unpredictable. The reason for this might be the 
effect of individual self reflection and individual interpretation of situations.  
Organization literature gives reference to both the view that identity for-
mation is an ongoing process in the organization (Hatch and Schultz 2004), 
and the opposite view that individuals have multiple identities, decoupled 
meaning systems, and are able to distance themselves and protect themselves 
from this type of influence (Sturdy 1998). Following Giddens (1995), we 
may expect to find, in a modern workplace, not only alienation and reliance 
on abstract systems, but also more intimate relations and locally developed 
systems of trust.  
This type of perspective on the organization, and its subsequent attention 
to the involvement of the employee, has identity-formation consequences. 
This is in line with Shotter’s argument (Shotter 2004). As Shotter writes:  
“…I have tried to outline a more adequate account of what is to be a per-
son and to bring into view the fact that the spontaneously expressed, re-
sponsive relations between us (that are rendered rationally invisible in our 
academic theorizing), are crucial to our personhood.”  
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This argument resembles what Giddens (1984: 45) talks about as discursive 
consciousness. It indicates that subjectivity of expression is essential for 
developing a human environment.15 
Following this argument, involvement is a factor that defines how close or 
remote an action is from one’s inner personal self, from the emotional and 
mental process of self reflection (Schütz 1972). Involvement is also related to 
how deep and sincere our relations are with others, what value we put into the 
relations.16 Involvement is in this sense an exposition of the human self. It is 
a non-calculative relation and a situation where we act in a sincere way. In 
Buber’s terms, it can be called inclusion (Buber 1970). Inclusion indicates a 
deep personal involvement in the wellbeing of the other, an involvement that 
affects not only Thou, but also I. A relation based on deep involvement and 
real trust is characterized by inclusion, that is, a situation or a process in 
which I am affected by the other (Thou).17 Deep involvement with the other 
means therefore both to be close to the other, but also to be committed and 
willing to “give” parts of your self into an activity. In that respect, you are 
vulnerable, you take a risk. There are therefore good reasons for not being 
involved. As Chris Argyris writes:  
                                           
15  Restrictive environments restrain the individual’s possibility to flourishing and 
development. Subsequently, as du Gay observes, the theory of alienation in the latter 
Marxist formlacks a discussion on how the individual subjects reconcile their own ex-
istence with the existence as a collective subject (du Gay 1996: 17). 
16  My argument is based on the assumption of methodological individualism, that is that 
the individual has a sovereign, autonomous and unique self, but that this is constrained 
by certain situations. I assume that we sometimes have to involve basic aspects of this 
self, even with the consequence that self understanding or identity is influenced and 
changed. Individual autonomy therefore does not mean complete freedom; it is a sort 
of constrained autonomy, since we are constrained by commitments and situations. 
17  In order to understand the type of trust related to this situation, it is important to pay 
notice to Buber’s term “really mean […].” The term really is an absolute requirement. 
To be something really is not to make some trade-off, or some calculation or to objec-
tify (which most often is the character of scientific knowledge) – rather, to be some-
thing really is an unconditional imperative. In its absolute sense, this is a very strong 
prerogative. According to Buber, we would never be able to experience absolute inclu-
sion towards other people, only towards God. However, this does not change any of 
the important aspects or relevance of Buber’s arguments in everyday situations. 
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“Apathy, lack of interest and non-involvement are types of defense 
mechanisms [...].“ (Argyris 1965: 89) 
To get involved in a system or a person represents an investment and a risk, 
and therefore the possibility to be let down. The risk is both related to our 
own ignorance on how involvement will affect us, and also related to the 
undetermined development of the relation to the other. 
Subsequently it is so important, and at the same time difficult, to know 
when to be involved and when to be alert to the other; we would not like to 
be over-sensitive towards the other; rather we like to be there as fellow 
humans when we are needed, to be sensitive when something other than 
everyday routines are conveyed to us, without being patronizing. Involve-
ment is, as I see it, not the same as patronizing. 
Patronizing implies that you position yourself above and outside the other, 
you are caring for the other. Being involved, as I defined it, is not the same as 
being caring. Caring can be patronizing, it can be an attitude where we place 
ourselves outside the other, even if we take care of her.18 Patronizing, 
thereby, can be a role.19 Caring can also be asymmetrical and patronizing, as 
when somebody needs help. In this case it can be both involved and under-
standing. So we might be able to understand the other, not from mutual 
dialogue and learning, but rather from empathy and identification. But the 
distinction between these two understandings of caring is as essential as it is 
difficult to observe. It should be noted that a person, like an involved re-
searcher, might not herself be fully aware of the motives that drives her in the 
situation. In both of the two cases I presented earlier, it was difficult for me 
as a researcher to be sure of my motives. In both cases I tried to help, but on 
what ground did I help? Did I help because I sympathized with the persons or 
because I felt obliged since I was engaged in the process? Would I have 
                                           
18  Ref. Argyris (2004): caring in Model I is patronizing, but in Model II it is not, since 
the caring person does not subscribe a solution for the other, but engages in a mutual 
relationship in order to create new possibilities. 
19  Involvement in the Buber sense referred above, on the other hand, is to really care in a 
symmetric relation; to be effected by the other, to let the other mean something for 
you, to suspend your professional thinking, your role, your mask. 
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helped and responded in the same way if I did not find the two persons 
sympathetic? I cannot tell.  
To summarize the argument in this section: Modern workplaces are not 
only instrumental, alienating and dehumanizing; in fact they often explicitly 
accept and even expect personal involvement and engagement. The challenge 
is not the employees’ right to be involved, that challenge is rather the fact that 
modern workplaces are so complex that being involved implies a vulnerabil-
ity and risk that might explain why employees choose not to be involved.   
The cases I will use to illustrate this were both, as I see it, examples of 
employees that became involved with their work situation (personalized it) to 
an extent that exceeded what they were prepared for. They both in a way 
entered the “risk zone” of involvement at work. As I as an Action Researcher 
in both case had influenced the developments that led up to this, I was also 
affected. Also it is important to notice that when this situation occurred, my 
role was not one of caring or helping, in fact I was as Action Researcher 
already involved myself. How should I handle this?   
Respectful involvement presupposes that we have an initial opinion about 
the other, but it also implies that we have a sensitivity towards the other that 
challenges our predefined understanding of the other. Involvement forces and 
allows us to reflect on these sense-impressions. This type of involved relation 
and reflection is an essential part of our being; our existence as a human. In 
that I agree with Shotter (2004). But at the same time I think that we can be 
(and normally are) non-involved in the sense of playing roles, are inauthentic 
and do not reflect on our feelings towards the other, but act out routines and 
roles. We do that, I believe, without being dehumanised. That is, I will think 
that there is a middle ground or degrees of engagement between involvement 
and alienation. This middle ground is like our everyday presentation of our 
self (Goffman 1959), or role taking or what Etzioni calls calculative in-
volvement. 
The point I will make below is my reflection on how an Action Re-
searcher can and should handle a situation of involvement, like my two cases. 
My argument is that it requires not only empathy, respect and personal 
understanding of the other, but also some degree of objectification, role 
taking and respectful othering. Being involved often implies to be in real time 
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situations that are ambiguous, complex and confusing. As a researcher you do 
not have the distance and often not even the time to reflect and gather enough 
information to support your choices. Still you are supposed to be a researcher 
and to represent some sort of objectivity. Respectful othering implies both 
skills and some wisdom when you do your judgments, but also ability to 
decompose the different processes that are at play; both to understand the 
other, to understand oneself, to understand one’s relation to the other and to 
understand the situation this interaction is embedded in.    
4.  Knowledge through involvement – establishing internal validity 
In this section I will try to answer my research question: how can we as social 
scientists research others through involvement, and develop true knowledge 
about the other, without “othering” them, that is, not objectifying them or 
making an instrument of our research, but rather be respectful of the other as 
a person? This is mainly a question about research design principles. Our 
challenge is to get intimate knowledge of the other in order to understand the 
uniqueness of the other as a person. But it is also to get a truthful understand-
ing of the situation that you are involved in. I will refer to this as internal 
validity. Internal validity implies that we have been able to get a right under-
standing of the other, in accordance with his or her understanding of herself 
(authenticity). But it also implies getting beyond pure subjectivity and idio-
syncrasy. It implies also understanding the situation and the context that the 
other is part of. 
Based on the discussion in section 3, I will make a division between four 
areas of knowledge that we are likely to find in an involved research situa-
tion: knowledge about oneself, knowledge about the other, knowledge about 
the relation and knowledge about the situation. These areas of knowledge 
exist in a totality and not as separate domains; however, by decomposing the 
knowledge generation process into these four areas, it will be easier to iden-
tify the different knowledge elements.20 I will use the two cases I have pre-
                                           
20  My model has only two persons, where we can think of the “I” person as a researcher 
who gets involved with another person. My discussion does not extend beyond this 
social setting. As will also be seen from my discussion, each of the four areas of 
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sented as illustrations of my more general and abstract point. My two cases 
do not illustrate all there is to say about this, but I think they illuminate some 
of the main points.    
Self-reflective knowledge 
I have argued that deep or real involvement has an effect on oneself. That is, 
if I am really involved, it will probably affect me and do something to me; 
my values are challenged, I am in a sense transformed, or my insights are 
changed, in ways that influence how I perceive and interpret situations. If so, 
it challenges my “scientific” pretension of being an objective observer, or at 
least to stand for a stable consistent reporting of an event. This was what I 
experienced in both of the cases to which I have referred above. 
In both cases I found myself in a position when the critical incidents oc-
curred, that I was not prepared for. I had not foreseen that my relation to the 
union leader (case 1) and the team leader (case 2) was that personal. Our way 
of conversation changed during the process from politeness and more formal 
discussions to being very emotional and personal. I had to rethink if I was up 
to that, if this was what I really wanted, and if I believed in the whole project 
we were involved in. I really questioned whether I should continue as a 
researcher.   
But what might I learn from this type of transformation, and how can I 
make a true report if I myself am transformed? Being alert to how situations 
and events influence my perception might give me valuable knowledge. This 
self reflective knowledge that comes from a self transformation through 
interaction with others, is a sort of basic learning and socialization process in 
society. It is what G. H. Mead (1962) referred to as individual development, 
that allows us to understand orders and forms in society. Subsequently it is 
learning and transformation that goes beyond the individual event, and allows 
                                           
knowledge touch on larger theoretical fields of which I can here only scratch the sur-
face. However, the intention is not to give a theoretical contribution to each of these 
fields but to indicate some categories of knowledge that are related to each area or 
field. 
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us to understand not only what happened in that particular situation, but also 
about social forms.21  
An important aspect of Habermas’ communicative project has been to de-
rive how cognitive and normative structures, being aimed at mutual under-
standing, are transformed through language and the communicative process. 
To establish such connections, one can turn to developmental psychology 
(Dryzek 1996). Communicative action has in it a strong development ele-
ment, since participation in communicative and involved processes contrib-
utes to personal development and growth. This development perspective is 
referred to as the self-transformation thesis (Warren 1992). Broadly, this 
thesis argues that the individual, through participation in the democratic 
communicative processes, over time develops a democratic mind. This 
implies, in other words, that over time the communicative processes will 
result in communicative action, as opposed to strategic action by the individ-
ual.22  
One can also see this self-reflection knowledge as a sort of phenomenol-
ogy of involvement that influences our meaning system. Phenomenology, 
using Max Scheler (1973: 137) is a sort of grounded approach, where one 
poses fundamental questions about phenomena one experiences in close 
                                           
21  It is also this insight by Mead that Habermas relies on when he talks about communi-
cative action, and we might also link it to Argyris’ (2004) concept of model II learn-
ing. In both these theoretical perspectives it is a reflection on self-transformation that 
leads to insight into our cognitive “structure” (Gustavsen 1992; Johnsen 2001).    
22  It must be emphasized that, as I see it, the self-transformation hypothesis is not the 
same as an internalizing process. Internalization would mean the same as what I re-
ferred to as Giddens’ social consciousness theory above. I think we can reject that and 
still talk about self transformation. My use of self-transformation will then mean that 
the individual does not internalize a set of values at the sacrifice of own reflexivity. 
The self-transformation applies to the transition from strategic to communicative ac-
tion, or rather – the transition from a strategic to a communicative mind. To some ex-
tent, one could say that this idea of self-transformation is in conflict with the idea of an 
autonomous, reflective mind, however I should like to see it rather as a term that de-
scribes what happens as a consequence of our reflections. By framing self transforma-
tion this way, as a learning process, allows us to consider situations where the trans-
formation goes from involved to strategic action. 
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(subjective) encounters. It is a reflection based on a (more or less) suspension 
of predefined assumptions (Isaacs 1999).23  
Given then the approach to self transformation presented here, and based 
on this brief discussion of the theme and a position that I will argue is rather 
normative, one might ask what sort of knowledge this process provides. We 
might expect that the researcher in an involved situation will be able to report 
how involvement has changed her experience (meaning system), and also 
what reflection this has led to. We will expect that the researcher also reports 
what is the most honest implication that one might draw from this experience. 
But, as noted above, the researcher might not be able to fully account for her 
motives.  
It is also logical that the further reporting of that event is made on the ba-
sis of this new insight, and that this will be different from what was the 
perspective when the process started. The main point here is that the sort of 
existential, phenomenological self reflection that high involvement implies 
might bring you out of your professional role as a researcher, and you en-
counter the field as “yourself only”.24  
As a researcher you become the real receiver, a subject in social science, 
as discussed among others by John Law (2004). In principle this is no new 
acknowledgement; social scientists have more or less always been partici-
pants and thereby acknowledge their subjective account of their observation. 
The point I make here goes beyond this. It argues that real involved research 
(as I have defined it) implies a level of subjective transformation that really 
challenges the researcher’s self. I believe that in an involved situation, the 
                                           
23  Although both Heidegger (2007) and Gadamer (2006) will argue that we always have 
pre-understanding. However we might talk about degrees of defensive mechanisms 
and Gadamer talks about a self reflection in the sense of reflection over the way you 
reflect. It is a sort of coming out of hermeneutic circles, to be able to have a critical 
perspective of what one perceives. In Schütz’ terms, we can talk about schemes of ex-
perience (Schütz 1972: 82). Cf. critique of (EPOKHÊ – Husserl) in Eikeland (1997) 
and in more practical terms we might link this to the concept of sense making (Weick 
1995). However, as argued here, the frame of reference will always refer back to soci-
ety (Holzner 1968). 
24  This is a complicated sentence, for sure, but I assume that the common sense meaning 
is clear, it assumes that your professional role is different from you as a private person. 
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subjective perception of the researcher is of great importance to the knowl-
edge that is constructed or produced. 
Returning to my own experience, it implied that as the two persons I was 
engaged with went into a situation where they questioned their identity, their 
whole project and their reason for having the job they had, similar issues 
came up in my mind. I easily saw that their discussions and expressions 
touched me with sympathy to the extent that I could identify with their 
situation. Subsequently, as for instance linked to my dialogue with the team 
leader, my own disappointments and defeats in work life, came to mind. In 
my responding, I probably mixed up her and my own situation.   
Knowledge about the other    
Knowledge about the other must be seen in relation to self reflection knowl-
edge (Schütz 1972). Your self reflection will have told you something about 
your ability and willingness to encounter the other, your values in relation to 
meeting the other and the repertoire of senses that you will use in interpreting 
the other (Ricæur 1992). The essential thing here is that high involvement 
implies that you see not only yourself above roles, norms and forms, but you 
see the other that way too. The other becomes a subject, not an object for 
you. If not, the other will not reveal her more inner self to you. This of course 
presupposes that your attention is not only towards self reflection, but that 
you are empathic, altruistically or sincerely interested in the other. The other 
must be a subject, not an object to you.25  
Closeness to the other implies a whole set of ethical issues. Closeness eth-
ics (Levinas, Buber) is a very normative approach to discussing these rela-
tions as well as implying an ontological and epistemological position. It 
makes the argument that ethics is more fundamental than thought and action, 
it is prior to thought. The terms of It and Thou could be a useful and essential 
one to illustrate this. I use Buber as a reference here: I can remain unaffected 
by an encounter with It, but encountering a Thou, going into a relation, does 
something with me. I am not unaffected by a Thou relation. What Buber 
                                           
25  See Sonntag (2003) on how we can observe the pain of others without being affected. 
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(1970) indicates, is that we pass a threshold when we go from an I – It situa-
tion to an I – Thou situation. While the first is based on causality and calcula-
tion, the second is a relation. In my terminology, the I – Thou relation re-
quires a different and more personal involvement and trust, than the I – It 
situation. What then, is the nature of the I – Thou relation?  
Furthermore, we can discover and disclose this ethic in closeness with 
“the other”, see the other in their eyes. Following this position, real, intimate 
involvement gives us access to (ethical) knowledge that we would not have 
without involvement. The other as a real, human being brings a dimension to 
our perception or is the foundation of our perception. The other is not a thing, 
but opens a universe to us. We see ourselves in the other, and we see the 
other not only as an object but as a subject. In Levinas’ (1972) words, the 
other becomes a window into myself.26  
Again drawing from my two cases, I think that what happens in real life is 
that you develop a sort of sympathy for the other. I think this sympathy is 
important for you to see aspects of the other that were previously not appar-
ent. The union leader suddenly appeared as a different person when he called 
me and asked for personal advice. He revealed his vulnerability, and thereby 
suddenly was to me, not only the tough and somewhat one-dimensional union 
leader, but a more complex and thoughtful person. This insight also allowed 
me to see his arguments and why he had mistrusted management in a more 
sympathetic way. At the same time it implied that I had the possibility to talk 
to him in a different way and also be more open with my own reflections. 
With the team leader (case 2), the situation was somewhat different. First 
of all, the challenge she faced was much more negative (the change process 
was less in her favour). Secondly she reacted very emotional, and as she was 
a woman and I a male, I found it difficult to be very intimate. I also found it 
more difficult to understand her emotional behavior. Subsequently, I proba-
bly distanced myself more and had less chance to get a deep and true insight 
into her situation. A question here would be what I could, given the situation, 
use such an insight for?      
                                           
26  See Paul Ricoæur (1992), yourself as the other, a symbiosis that establishes the other 
as an ontology. 
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The practical aspect of the type of involvement I discuss here, is that in-
volvement gives insight into the intention of the other (authenticity) that 
thereby can be communicated outside this relation, and by that one avoids 
stigmatization and objectification of the other. If I am involved with another, 
I will know or disclose that person’s sincerity, motives and individuality. 
Involvement gives me insight into the unique in the other27. As a researcher, I 
can then report about this uniqueness and truthfulness of the other (her real 
intentions)28 that I would not have had access to if I was not involved.  
But having said this, I believe I have also outlined how vulnerable and 
complicated such a relation and insight is. It requires special skills and wis-
dom, and probably a good fit between me as a researcher and the other. Had I 
in both cases been wiser, I should have prepared the two for situations like 
the ones that occurred. That might have allowed us to know each other better 
in advance, and might have improved the dialogue when the critical situation 
occurred. But personal skills also play a role. It is probable that what I as a 
researcher am able to perceive from this type of relation is very much defined 
by my own repertoire of emotions and experiences29.  
Knowledge about the relation 
To engage in involved relations is to try to reach co-ordination and common 
understanding, what Habermas (1997) refers to as communicative action, or 
what Lincoln and Guba (1985) call cooperative knowledge. But communica-
tive action does not mean co-ordinating individual meaning, values and 
                                           
27  Alfred Schütz (1972) talks about a stream of consciousness that we apply in our 
interpretation of the other in order to be alert and have a spontaneous experience of the 
other. This might bring us towards a genuine understanding of the other in a dialogue 
of simultaneous and bodily expressions. This way of seeing the other is contrasted 
with a more abstract understanding (typology, categorisation, etc).  
28  See for instance Charles Taylor (1998) in Autentisitetens etikk who refers to George 
Herbert Mead (1962) called “significant other”. The human mind is not monological 
but dialogical. 
29  As Susan Sontag (2003) observes, being sentimental to others’ pain does not imply 
that one really cares, suffers and is effected by the other. Subsequently, sentimentality 
can be a purely egoistic emotion.  
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beliefs. Communicative action aims at reaching a common, valid description 
that is true and legitimate. It is this process of finding a true and legitimate 
description of a phenomenon in a communication that is referred to as the 
process of interpretation. The relation creates an inter-subjective reality, an 
agora or a communicative community.30 This more practical aspect of close-
ness is sensitive to how close you are able to get to the other and how trustful 
the relation is.  
The process of mutual interpretation, that of finding mutual and valid de-
scriptions of the objective and the social world, presupposes a subject. This 
subject can relate to the social and objective worlds in different ways charac-
terized by different types of acts. The subject exists in his or her lifeworld. 
Habermas, however, does not ascribe to subjects characteristics like identity 
or alienation. That is so because of the subject’s ontological independence. 
However there is a coupling between the self and the social world, as the 
meaning construction through communicative action is the way the individual 
builds relations between herself and the social world.31 
There are two main dimensions of this relation, the one is reciprocal, the 
other centres on each individual’s recognition. When the subject is involved 
in the relation, she/he takes part in a communicative process. The outcome of 
this process is a new, better and or common interpretation of the world. The 
process of reaching a common understanding (as distinct from common 
meaning or beliefs) takes part in a social process within a set of norms and 
rules, in a discourse. So we can see the involved relation as a formation of an 
inter-subjective, particular and unique discourse. In Shotter’s words, the 
reciprocity in an “ideal talk situation” creates humanity: “…people’s local, 
living, spontaneously responsive connections to each other…” (Shotter 2004: 
31). 
What is important here seen in relation to involved research is that the re-
search situation is a formal situation, a formal and limited relationship. I do 
                                           
30  See Habermas (1997); on Agora, see Nowotny et al. (2001). 
31  This is “the young” Wittgenstein’s point, that language is the only way by which we 
can reach out of one self, and language is by its nature a social phenomenon. So ex-
pressing oneself in words, means to make social sense of one self, make one self social 
(Wittgenstein 2001). 
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not think there are absolute truths about how this relationship should be, but 
it is different from friendship. You might be emotionally and personally 
involved as researcher, but you are still a researcher. From my two cases I 
realize that it is difficult to draw boundaries on the relation. You probably 
can not foresee what sympathies and developments in the relation to the other 
will occur during the process. What I think could be a way of avoiding that 
this becomes a problem, is to have an open reflection on the relation. This 
implies to have both parties developing a mutual understanding of this rela-
tion. In my case, I should have done this, had I been more experienced.     
This raises an interesting question that I will not go into, but that could be 
of interest to the study of involved research. It is not only the case that recip-
rocity implies that the researcher “enters into” the lifeworld of the other, but 
also that the other enters into the lifeworld of the researcher. If so, should not 
the subject also care about the researcher? It is well known that the researcher 
influences the other. What might happen is that the other behaves or responds 
to the researcher in ways that are supported to confirm the researcher’s 
assumptions and pre-understandings. The object might adopt the researcher’s 
language and concepts of describing her situation.  
My point then is that through this process of mutual understanding, we 
already engage in a process of objectification. In the process of interpretation 
we bring in our pre-understandings and our references to the “outside” world. 
Language links us to the outside world. Putting our experiences into lan-
guage, means a sort of socializing these experiences, put them into categories 
that are defined by language (Wittgenstein 2001).  
What knowledge does this relation (discourse) give us? First of all, as 
with any discourse, the process is that of testing arguments against each 
other, and thereby developing better arguments. The relation gives us the 
possibility to test assumptions, and thereby develop a mutual understanding. 
Through this relation, we learn to know the other for good and bad. We learn 
about limitations and about preconditions. In the relation we influence each 
other. Asking questions might bring about awareness on issues that the other 
did not have in mind. The researcher thereby contributes to the relation, and 
in that respect is a participant rather than only a spectator (Skjervheim 1959). 
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The quality of what we observe then has to do with the quality of that relation 
that, among others, points back to qualities of the researcher.    
Having said this, I think it is also right to say that such a mutual under-
standing of a relation can have the consequences of limiting the insight one 
will have in each other. It establishes a sort of area of appropriateness that 
both parties relate to. It is the sort of mutual contract you are working on. 
Drawing this line of appropriateness became important in both the cases I 
have presented.   
Knowledge about the situation 
The situation is where the self, the other and the relation expose themselves. 
The situation is the structure and conditions under which this meeting takes 
place. It is the external dimension of this meeting and this relation. This 
external system dimension is already present when we talk to the other (ref 
Habermas referred earlier and Levinas when he talks about the one, the 
second and the third (which we can interpret as society or humanity).32 The 
discourse that develops in the relation is not exposed in isolation, but within 
the context of the situation. Even spontaneous reactions that one might have 
on others’ expressions will normally reveal pre-understandings and expecta-
tions that are rooted in conventions and norms in society. 
There is a degree of personal choice in every situation and thereby the 
possibility for different outcomes of the relations, that is: different levels of 
closeness and trust in the situation. But I do believe that we can talk about the 
logic of a situation (Holzner 1968; Popper 1979; Barwise/Parry 1986; Bar-
wise 1989). A company and a workplace represent such a logic. A workplace 
is a formal structure with division of power, position and labour. As Giddens 
writes:  
                                           
32  There is in Levinas’ (1972) and Ricoeur’s (1992) theorising an intersubjective norma-
tivity that develops as a consequence of our encounter with the other. With the facing 
of the other, we run into a responsibility for the other’s well being. This awareness of a 
responsibility towards the other is present in any dialogue and also the awareness of 
the other is part of what forms the dialogue. Ethical reflection of a general kind, as 
something beyond the unique encounter, is thereby present in the encounter.   
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“structure is regarded as rules and resources recursively implicated in so-
cial reproduction; institutionalized features of social systems have struc-
tural properties in the sense that relationships are stabilized across time 
and space.“ (Giddens 1984: xxxi) 
Social structures are more or less present in a given situation and more or less 
formalized.  
A personal meeting, as a unique personal event between two persons, is 
by its nature more open and undecided, and thereby different from a formal 
encounter in, for instance, a formal work environment. A formal work envi-
ronment will by nature thrive on stability and reproduction. If the two are 
confused, the unique encounter and the formal meeting, there will be a con-
flict of situational logics. This is to some extent seen with emotional labour, 
or very personal service encounters (Hochschild 1983). What often happens 
in such mixed situations is that the logics are mediated. In such cases, one 
finds a way to be both human and sensitive and still relate to the formal 
structures of the situation. 
The critical incidents in my two cases were of this kind. They created 
mixed situations and confusion of roles. In case 1, with the union leader, I 
experienced the situation as all in all positive. I believed in the project we 
were running. I was convinced that co-operation in the company would be 
better than the conflict they had for years. I saw and identified with the 
dilemma that the union leader had come into, but I was convinced that he 
would be better off if he trusted management and involved in co-operation. I 
and the team of researchers I was part of, demanded that any change towards 
a new regime of collaboration should be stated in a contract between man-
agement and union so that none of the parties should be tempted to behave 
opportunistically. We as researchers would supervise the further process to 
see that it was fair and according to intentions.  
With the team leader in the hotel, the situation was different. The new 
owner, a large hotel chain, had different concepts for organizing and manag-
ing than the ones we had proposed. Since we disagreed with the changes, it 
was easier to play into the negative emotions of the team leader. On the other 
hand, I found it difficult, and quite a dilemma, to take the role of undermining 
the new management. The situation here was quite complicated. I could be 
 Scientific Knowledge through Involvement – How to Do Respectful Othering 69 
  
 
sympathetic to the team leader, but I could do little to change the situation. It 
was a sort of social fact that the hotel would adopt a different management 
policy. My sympathy with the team leader could not change or conceal that.      
Subsequently the personal encounter and high involvement is spelled out 
within the constraints of a situation. To some extent this situation is a percep-
tion, and there is not only one situation, for example within an organization.33 
In addition to this mere personal structuring, there are some situational logics 
that we need to comply with. The relative importance of the situation will 
vary between encounters, but I believe that we always have a reference to 
something beyond the unique moment of personal involvement and interac-
tion.  
My further argument is, in accordance with my discussion about involve-
ment, that situational logics are something we move in and out of, and that 
we can have some sort of control of. That is, we can for instance choose to 
refer to formal constraints in the situation in order to increase stability and 
control, and decrease uniqueness and intimacy. Structure and logics of situa-
tions are not only imposed constraints, they might be chosen constraints. 
How the other chooses to refer to these constraints will tell us something 
about the willingness to accept closeness and openness.34  
Summaries: decomposing the situation of involvement 
The point I have tried to make is that by decomposing, analyzing or decon-
structing the involved situation between the researcher and a subject, we can 
see how different knowledge elements stand in relation to each other. What I 
believe happens when we are involved is that we try to make meaning out of 
the knowledge involvement gives us. Our self reflection, the knowledge 
about the relation, the other and the situation, all have somehow to make 
sense. If it does not make sense, we probably search for explanations. Not all 
                                           
33  A reference here is Merleau-Ponty (1989) and his phenomenology, where he argues 
that in a situation in the present there is an intuition of former present and recollec-
tions, that creates continuity and unity between the past and the present. 
34  Talking within and about the situation, in and out of roles, back stage / on stage is an 
approach to organizational learning see Eikeland (1997). 
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of us are equally sensible to a situation, or equally wise or skillful to handle 
them, and often we will ignore information that does not make sense. Some 
will be more sensitive and identify more knowledge through involvement 
than others. This then indicates that the researcher plays a subjective role in 
involved research. Sometimes experiences from involvement might be shock-
ing (Holzner 1968). Shocking experiences will mean that we have to investi-
gate further if this is true and might subsequently help us to start reconsider-
ing beliefs and values. My two cases were not of this kind, but they were 
challenging and made an impact on me. 
This discussion therefore shows that there are limits to involved knowl-
edge. Research can never reach into the lifeworld of others as such, only to 
parts of it since lifeworlds are at least partly, common. Real humanism and 
respect for others in my mind implies that there are limits to scientific knowl-
edge, and there are limits to what level of personal knowledge that social 
science should strive at. So, instead of having an argument where intimate 
lifeworld knowledge is contrasted to more objective, system world knowl-
edge, I believe we can have a more fruitful discussion if we discuss what type 
of knowledge involvement gives us, and what part of that knowledge is 
relevant outside the lifeworld situation.  
Furthermore, I think the discussion shows that involved research really is 
an inter-subjective activity that already, at a dyadic level, produces social 
rather than individual lifeworld knowledge. This social knowledge has taken 
the lifeworld knowledge of the other at least one step in direction of structur-
ing, classifying and objectifying. It has become, what Schütz (1972) and 
Searle (1995) refer to as social facts.   
Being an involved researcher is difficult and requires special skills. It also 
requires a lot of the other, and of the situation one is in. Research, aiming at 
co-generated knowledge and at being useful and contribute to change, has to 
happen in close co-operation with those that the research concerns, subse-
quently they themselves are partly responsible for a successful outcome. 
Even if these requirements are met, the researcher cannot report the full and 
real lifeworld experience. All reporting will have to imply some sort of 
normalization, co-generated, inter-subjective categorization. Involved re-
search will thereby imply a sort of objectification of the observations and 
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experiences. However, this need not come into conflict with being human, 
understanding and respectful. In fact, the key to good research practice 
(leading up to internal validity) is to be found in the skills that the researcher 
has, related to the issues and challenges that an involved situation requires. 
Done in the right way, this will provide respectful othering.   
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